The examination of this alternative reveals two tensions to be addressed. It then examines a prominent argument against the viability of practical wisdom that proposes a situationist alternative. ) Inspired by recent discussions in roboethics, the paper departs from the consideration of practical wisdom as a key idea to evaluating human–technology interaction. This paper proposes that an embodied, enactive cognition approach aptly captures the various ways persons and artefacts interact, while at the same time avoiding the explanatory problems its functionalist alternative faces. But it remains unclear which cognitive processes ground such interactions in both their regular and virtuous forms. This attention informs the growing realization that virtue has an important role to play in the ethical evaluation of human–technology relations. Virtue ethics enjoys new-found attention in philosophy of technology and philosophical psychology.
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